

Connecticut Courant.

AND

WEEKLY INTELLIGENCER.

HARTFORD: PRINTED BY HUDSON AND GOODWIN, NEAR THE BRIDGE.

WANTED, a quantity of white FLANNEL, yard wide, for which Cash will be paid, by HUDSON AND GOODWIN.

James Bulkeley

Has Just received and this day opened and are ready for SALE at the Store of Maj. GEORGE PHILIPS in MIDDLETOWN—

An elegant assortment of EUROPEAN and INDIA GOODS, suitable for the present season, on as low terms as can be purchased in this State, for Cash or country Produce.—The most strict attention will be given to all those Gentlemen and Ladies who will favor him with their custom.

N. B. An elegant assortment of Ladies English SHOES, to be sold as low as can be purchased in New-York.—Best of BOHEA TEA by the Cwt. or less Quantity.

Middletown, July 7, 1788.

A Generous price given for Loan-Office Certificates and Pierce's, Thompson's, Burrall's, and Walker's Final Settlements— at the Store of

PETER COLT & Co.

Hartford, July 9, 1788.

BY direction of the Hon. Court of Probate for the district of Waterbury, the creditors of the estate of Mr. Uzal Barker, late of Watertown, deceased, are hereby notified to bring in their claims on said estate to Eliasaph Barker, one of the Executors of the last Will and Testament of the said Uzal—within six months from this date—or they will be foreclosed.

UZAL BARKER, } Executors.
ELIASAPH BARKER, }

Dated at Watertown, the 7th day of June, 1788.

Ten Dollars Reward.

RUN away from the Subscriber on the evening following the 30th of June, a negro man named Oney, about twenty years of age, about five feet eight inches high, very black, has lost the middle finger of his left hand; had on when he went off a butternut coloured Coat and Vest, coloured tow cloth Trowsers, was barefoot; also an Apprentice, molatto boy named Mim Fagine, about eighteen years of age, five feet eight inches high; had on when he went off a brown sailor Jacket and green Vest, striped tow Shirt and plain tow cloth Trowsers, was barefoot; said fellows have once been taken in Hartford, and by violent means made their escape.—Whoever will take up secure or return said boys to their Master—shall have the above reward, or five Dollars for either of them, and all reasonable charges paid by EBENEZER BISHOP and FERA CLARK.

N. B. All Matters of vessels and others are forbid harbouring, concealing, or carrying off said fellows on penalty of the Law.

Lisbon, June 30, 1788.

William Seymour and Co.

HAVE this day received by the Julia, Muscorado Sugars of the first quality—best assorted Old Iron—Sheet Lead, and Molasses, for Sale on the lowest terms for Cash or Indian Corn.

WANTED, 1000 bushels Indian Corn.

THE proprietors of the Township of Calderburg in the County of Orange, State of Vermont are hereby notified, that at a legal meeting of said proprietors on the 8th day of instant July; a Tax of One Pound Nineteen Shillings and Six pence, on each right, was granted for allotting said Township. A Tax of Eight Pounds for granting fees, yet remains unpaid by several of said proprietors, to be paid by the last day of October next. Notice is hereby given to all concerned that unless said Tax and granting fees are paid by said last day of October next, their lands will be disposed of agreeable to the laws of the State of Vermont. For the convenience of those who live in Connecticut, payment, may be made to Captain Daniel Marsh of East-Hartford, who is empowered to receive the same.

THOMAS JONSPON, Collector.
Newbury, (State of Vermont) July 8, 1788.

BRITISH STATE OF POLITICS.

For MAY, 1788.

DURING a profound peace among the maritime powers, Great-Britain ever enjoyed more consequence in the scale of nations than at the present moment. Though lately divested of territorial possessions, the most extensive ever known since the fall of the ancient monarchies, she maintains her native grandeur with a dignity which commands universal admiration. By the United States of America she is still regarded as the power whose friendship is most favourable to their prosperity. In Europe her alliance, her commercial intercourse, her political mediation, are courted by the sovereigns of every climate. In Asia the glory of her empire surpasses whatever was before conceived of acquired dominion. And, that no part of the world may be exempted from her auspicious influence, she is now making a magnanimous effort for extending to the inhabitants of Africa the blessings of liberty and peace. Our commercial treaty with France appears to operate in manner the most advantageous to British subjects; while with the Dutch, at length happily recovered from their late infatuation, we have concluded a new alliance which promises to be more effectual and permanent than the former.

Such is at present the state of the nation with respect to foreign countries. The prospect of our domestic affairs is not less agreeable to the eye of a political observer. The national finances since the commencement of the public debt, were never in a more prosperous condition; and, from additional improvements proposed in the collection of the revenue, there is the strongest reason to expect that they will be brought in a short time, to a state of yet greater perfection. New canals, in various quarters have been for years increasing the internal trade of the British inhabitants; waste lands are daily submitting to the cultivation of industry; and the great augmentation of buildings, both in town and country, affords an undeniable proof that the number and wealth of the people are in a flourishing progression. In Scotland the spirit of a commercial enterprise diffuses with that of liberty; and the Irish experience a degree of prosperity unknown to their ancestors from their late political emancipation.

Mr. HASTINGS.

The trial of Mr. Hastings proceeds apace; and, should it be productive of no other effect, affords an opportunity, which happens not often, of displaying the dignity of the PATRIOTISM of Great-Britain, when assembled on important occasions, in their judicial capacity. It is, however a singular circumstance that an impeachment preferred by the House of Commons should be regarded by the nation with an almost total unconcern for the success of the prosecution, and even with sentiments of general attachment to the person and character of the accused; a strong proof that British generosity is superior to every prejudice which might effect the distribution of justice, or derogate from the claims of honest fame.

FRANCE.

The present situation of France is a contrast to that of Great-Britain. Her political importance astonishingly reduced, the intrigues of her court frustrated, and even her national faith openly violated, she is obliged to be an unwilling spectator of the renewal of ancient amity between England and the United provinces, as well as of the most unprovoked confederacy ever formed for the destruction of her Ottoman ally. Lulled in the soft fetters of a temporary matrimonial alliance, she either seems not to suspect the danger which must result from success attending the Imperial operations, or she sacrifices both her political and commercial interests to a precarious tranquillity, enjoyed at present without satisfaction, and which will be repaid, at a future period, by the reviving animosity of her aggrandized and inveterate rival. France is not less distracted in her views abroad than unhappy in her domestic situation. Her commerce, upon the whole, at least with Great-Britain, seems to be maintained more by importation than export; and by an incompatible policy, while she is grasping with eagerness at commercial advantages to her subjects, she is struggling for despotism. The flame of revolt which the fostered in America recoils on the vitals of France; and though smothered for a time by the habits of popular subjection, it will yet break forth with irresistible rage and in the end extinguish her monarchy.

CONFEDERACY OF THE IMPERIAL CROWNS.

This is one of the most formidable confederacies recorded in the annals of human kind; and what renders it the more remarkable, it seems to have been framed upon no principle of national justice or security, but with the resolution almost openly avowed of extirpating an established, and to them inoffensive, potentate from the political system of Europe. These powerful confeder-

ates, though differing in sex and character, are congenial at least in the sentiments of exorbitant ambition. The Russian, with a masculine vigour of mind has alternately sullied and adorned, by her vices and her virtues the throne of her barbarian predecessors; while the Austrian less bold and firm in his conduct, but untainted with the weakness of superstition, has hitherto chiefly confined his political enterprises to dilapidations of the church. The Imperial associates have at length commenced their operations; but as yet without much success. Their force, though inferior in point of numbers to the army of Xerxes, infinitely exceeds it in vigour and discipline; nor can it be much reduced by desertion in a country so remote from their own and among a people equally barbarous and hostile. But the political alliance of Russians and Austrians cannot bear the unanimity of the Persian multitude; and should dissension once find its way into the confederated camps, aided to all the flattering hopes of victory, conquest, and renown. Their enemies it must be admitted, are not inspired with that ardent spirit of liberty which actuated the Grecian republics of old against the Persian invader; but they are animated, in battle, with an enthusiasm unknown to the troops of other nations. The union of the two potentates is an alliance of interests, not of affection or esteem; and independently of the numerous accidents by which the success of their enterprise may be effected; it will be found no easy task to conduct the operations of an offensive war upon any determinate plan that will suit alike the extreme avidity of both parties. Without sufficiently alarming, they have excited the attention of all Europe by their military preparations, and may at last provoke its derision.

PRUSSIA.

The new sovereign of Prussia seems ambitious to emulate, in the department of state, the same of his great predecessor; and that he is not destitute of spirit, vigour, and enterprise, the world has lately in the settlement of Holland, beheld an unequivocal proof. So far as yet appears, he has threatened no obstruction to the measures of the Imperial allies; but we are not thence to conclude that he is really uninterested in the contingent result of their expedition. It would be unreasonable to suppose that, with an example before his eyes so recent as the affair of Bavaria, he should not apprehend more precious effects from a far greater accession of territory to the Austrian dominions, though situated beyond the bounds of the empire. We may be assured that he will watch the issue of the Imperial operations, with a degree of solicitude inseparable from the jealousy and prudent circumspection of a wise king. But he is connected with the Porte by no ties of commercial interest to excite his immediate interposition; and the emperor may be attacked with greater success when his army has been weakened, and his resources exhausted by some exertion, than in the outset of the war, and in the heat of the alliance, when he would be assisted with all the vengeance of an implacable empire, counteracted in the prosecution of a favourite project, and disappointed in sanguine expectations.

SPAIN.

This once powerful kingdom was for ages the terror of Europe; and aspired to be the arbitress of nations. By a series of fortunate events and an ambition peculiarly restless and heroic, in the sixteenth century, to an almost unexampled pitch of grandeur, until intoxicated with success, and reversing every maxim of policy, she hastened the decline of a constitution which, in the days of its vigour ransacked land and sea in the pursuit of dominions and riches; of dominions which proved pernicious by their great extent and of riches yet more fatal as productive of national proverty. Such is now the condition of Spain that she may view with a jealous but scarcely can with a vindictive eye the military enterprises of other European powers. There seems however to be a mystery in her present naval preparations; if not misperceived, which requires a little time to unfold. The equipment of seventeen or eighteen sail of the line is a force beyond all proportion to any danger which can be threatened by the depredation of Barbary corsairs. If it is intended to dispute with the Russian fleet the entrance of the Mediterranean, a positive reinforcement to that purpose might have precluded the necessity of the armament, and must according to the practice of all civilized nations, be an indispensable prelude to its exertion.

THE OTHER POWERS OF EUROPE.

These are all the other nations which at present make any prominent figure in the politics of Europe; with respect to the others which merit any attention it will be sufficient to give them a place in the back ground of our picture.

Portugal, notwithstanding her vicinity to Spain, con-

times to enjoy, through the jealousy of other powers, that tolerated independence which could neither at- tain by her own native strength, nor by the aid of her friends of foreign origin. The King of the Two Sicilies displays monarchial splendour in the pleasures of compa- sion luxury. Sardinia laid waste in the fiftieths which nature has planted around him. Holland which had been in a state of stagnation, assumes her commercial an- dustry. And Sweden and Denmark cease dilapidated planets, are now content to act occasionally, as dependent satellites in the more luminous powers that move in the political hemisphere.

The merchants of Scotland made by the burgees- ses of Scotland are well understood to be immediately submitted to the wisdom and justice of parliament. On the probable face of their application it would be pre- sumptuous in us to decide, but their moderate and fair- spirited petitions, full of good sense, we cannot but commend; and they ought to derive hope and confidence from the reflection that they are now to pre- sent their appeal before a tribunal whose penetration, directed to the real nature and effects of the system com- plained of, will not suffer itself to be misled by the par- tial and illusive representations of interested men, or by the gloss of the name of ancient constitution, with which it is attempted to preserve and fan the fiery abuse, and corruption in borough government.

PHILADELPHIA, July 16.
We have great pleasure in informing our friends in the country that twenty families of Swis arrived in this port a few days ago in one vessel. They all paid their passage before they left their native country, and with every comfort and necessity of life. As they come from an industrious, frugal and moral country enjoying a republican form of government, this colony will be highly acceptable. They intend to settle to- gether, on a body of land about 30 or 40 miles from the mouth of the Chesapeake.

The road from Philadelphia to the New- York is opened near 50 miles, so that only 15 miles remain to be opened to complete a road from Philadelphia to the port of New York, on the line of the Chesapeake. The road is now being about 15 miles from fourth to seventh. The road from 110 to the above road is opened for two thirds of the distance and the whole will be completed in a very short time. Several settlements have already been made in the interior of the country, and the completion of the road between the counties could have time to cut it, the people of the adjacent States finding they can get lands without an expensive and hard breaking journey to remote places, and that the country through which these roads pass, will never be disturbed by the war.

The price of year bids for the increase of the linen manufactory. Such quantities of flax have never been put—nor has so favorable a season been known for many years. A trade to Europe was the day when the country was to be cut off by our foreign trade. They have created a third lived necessity, which has become the mother of our manufacturers, while temporary distresses have prompted us to strengthen our general government, in a way that will enable us to act with more security in the future. The country will be more frugal, be industrious, be moral, be actively virtu- ous and yet shall indeed be happy.

Since the Federal government mostly relies on a further emission of paper money, it is said the Leg- islation of New York will take into consideration the propriety of making the loan-office bonds (with their three-fold landed securities) assignable to any person who will pay in the paper money, and that the money when paid in, will be immediately burnt. The securities and authority of the Government, which this con- tinuation of paper money will be left in every mat- ter of any consequence that occurs in the public or private business of this country.

A vessel from Bolton to the Cape of Good Hope and Mauritius had left, it is said to have taken out 2200 barrels of the choicest mutton, at 9 dollars per barrel, all warranted. Beef of the same quality, by letters from Cork, was then worth 9 dollars and one third; so that we have good reason to trust that we shall be able to vie with the Irish market, hereafter, in the price and quality of our beef. It would add to the profits of this branch, if we were to follow the Irish in the exportation of pickled tongues and tripe, of which they ship annually many thousand kegs.

NEW-YORK, July 18.
Last evening was launched the FEDERAL SHIP HAMILTON, amid the acclamations of a large concourse of citizens. From Poughkeepsie we learn that the Anti-federalists called for a trial question Monday last, but were over- ruled by a motion of Mr. Hamilton, seconded by Mr. G. Livingston, that the question be postponed till the next day, which was carried.

Next day Mr. Hamilton brought forward a plan for ratification, nearly similar to that of Virginia, only contain- ing more declarations. On this considerable debate took place, and much of the old ground gone over, and the decision again postponed till the next day. Extract of a letter from a gentleman in Luzerne County to his friend in Philadelphia, written July 9, 1788.
"I arrived here the 11th inst. and found the whole country in motion. I suppose you were informed of some striking business which was carried off. We people here had been some time waiting for the arrival of you, and towards of a 100 men went up the river the beginning of last week and one of the detachments consisting of 18 men, commanded by Capt. Rofs, fell in with the party of Wild Dogs, of 14 men when a battle ensued, in which 10 of the Wild Dogs were wounded (one of whom since died) Capt. Rofs unfortunately received a ball through his arm, entering his body below the ribs and lodg- ed on the other side (he cut out). We hope he will recover. This prevented his party from pursuing the retreating Wild Dogs."
We had a letter from Col. Pickering, dated in the woods, wherein we are informed, that he is well; and that he received a good usage as the situation of the country he is confined in will afford.

Extract of a letter from Poughkeepsie, July 9, 1788.
"The Sheriff, Major Miers and Captain Shaw, with his dragoons, marched up the river with upwards of 50 men; they encamped at Butter-milk Falls and from thence they went Capt. Rofs, with a party of 17 men into the woods near Marlborough where the interregnum were encamped, with orders to cross the river at Black Walnut Bottom, which they accordingly did, and that neighbourhood took a number of prisoners, six of whom we have now under a strong guard; they had not taken any, but are equally guilty. The names of the taken are, Martin Dudley, Joseph Kilburn, Nathan Abbott, Ephraim Taylor, Joseph Earle and Thomas King. The orders of the advanced party were to meet the main body on the 3d instant, at Dudley's house, at Marlborough where the dragoons were encamped. The main body did not arrive till the 10th instant, at the time appointed, where they expected to meet the main body, commanded by Miers and Shaw; but to their great surprize, when the detached party came to Marlborough, they were attacked by the interregnum who were put to flight, and the first fire of our small arms. The main body did not arrive till an hour and a half after the battle was over. Had the body come up at the time appointed, they would have killed and taken them all. I hope you will see your friend, that comes to me with a reward for those under arms."
It is with great pleasure that every friend to America hears of the cultivation of cotton in this auspicious year in the southern States. We hope the enlightened and accurate planters, in that part of the union, will not fail to give their most strenuous aid, with particular atten- tion to proceedings and success, in raising this interest- ing raw material.

JULY 22.
In our Convention, on Wednesday last, the 16th inst. the Hon. Judge Hobbs, presiding, at the request of Mr. Wadsworth, made the following motion, after having proposed with an excellent speech:
"WHEREAS since the time of electing the Delegates in Convention assembled the Constitution submitted to their consideration has been so far ratified as to constitute a system of government for ten of the United States, and the necessary measures are now pursuing for organizing and carrying the same into operation. And whereas at the time of the same election the citizens of several parts of this State were applied to certain articles of the said Constitution, and whereas from the impor- tant change, which has since the meeting of this Con- vention, taken place in the situation of public affairs, it is desirable that an opportunity should be given to the Delegates, to know fully the sentiments at present entertained by the citizens of this State, on a subject of so great importance, and which may so deeply affect the public peace and tranquility:
Therefore, Resolved, that this Convention do adjourn, until the day of next, then to meet at this motion engaged the attention of the House all that day.
The next day, (Thursday) previous to taking the question on this motion, Mr. Hamilton made another display of those great abilities for which he is justly distinguished; and he was successful in his reasoning, and in persua- sive eloquence and pathos, that he drew tears from most of the audience.
When he sat down, the question was called for and the division of the House was as follows:
Affirmative 21.
Negative 40.
Majority 18.
The Convention then went into a committee of the whole, and a proposition of Mr. Smith, that had been moved as an amendment to Mr. Jay's motion of the 11th inst. for adopting the Constitution; and a motion of Mr. Hamilton as an amendment to Mr. Smith's was then received.
The Hon. Mr. Duane then moved, that the confide- rance of Mr. Smith's propositions should be postponed in order to take up Mr. Hamilton's.
On this motion the division was called.
Affirmative 20.
Negative 41.
Majority 21.
The committee then took up the proposition of Mr. Smith, as the principle on which they would proceed; and in answer to which the Hon. Mr. Hamilton's argu- ments were urged. Mr. Smith got up, and with much candor confessed that the arguments that had been offered against his proposition, were not only weighty, but such as had induced him to relinquish it; and that he wished to withdraw his motion, and to leave the Convention to beg that he might be excused for many incursions that were in view. It had been drawn up in a great haste, and he hoped that he might have an opportunity of amend- ing it. It was such a proposition, he said as he thought would render the Convention, if they were to proceed at the same time it would afford to the opposition, all that facility for the consideration of the amendments which they wished.

Mr. Lapin said, if Mr. Smith withdrew his other proposition he should again move it; and of course both propositions remained before the Convention.
The motion is as follows:
"WE the Delegates of the people of the State of New- York, duly elected in pursuance of concurrent resolu- tions of the Senate and Assembly of the said State, per- fecting the day of and now met in Convention having fully and fairly discussed the Constitution pro- posed to our consideration, agreed upon by the Federal Convention, held in Philadelphia on the day of do make known and declare:
That after the most mature deliberation they have been able to give the subject, a majority of them cannot ap- prove the whole of the said Constitution, without amendments or alteration for the following among other reasons:
1. It Confutes the most important powers granted in this Constitution, are expressed in terms so general, in- definite and ambiguous; as to leave the rulers in the ex- ercise of them, to act too much at discretion.
2. The limits of the power of the General and State Government are not marked out with sufficient preci- sion; nor those of the former so defined as entirely to prevent a calling of jurisdiction; and there is reason to fear that the State Governments may be impaired by the General Government, and the exercise of powers grant- ed in such general words and by application only, — especially,
3d. Because the Constitution gives to the Congress an indefinite and unlimited power over all the sources of revenue in the United States; by which means they may fear that the United States will be left without ad- equate means of discharging debt or maintaining their civil establishments.
4th. Because the number of Representatives are not sufficiently numerous, authorized to possess a competent knowledge, and to exercise the trust of the Constituents, or to afford a reasonable degree of con- sidence; and no certain ratio of increase is fixed, but left at the discretion of Congress.
5th. Because the power of regulating the times place and manner of the election of the members of the Con- stituents, or to afford a reasonable degree of con- sidence; and no certain ratio of increase is fixed, but left at the discretion of Congress.
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Mr. Lapin said, if Mr. Smith withdrew his other proposition he should again move it; and of course both propositions remained before the Convention.
The motion is as follows:
"WE the Delegates of the people of the State of New- York, duly elected in pursuance of concurrent resolu- tions of the Senate and Assembly of the said State, per- fecting the day of and now met in Convention having fully and fairly discussed the Constitution pro- posed to our consideration, agreed upon by the Federal Convention, held in Philadelphia on the day of do make known and declare:
That after the most mature deliberation they have been able to give the subject, a majority of them cannot ap- prove the whole of the said Constitution, without amendments or alteration for the following among other reasons:
1. It Confutes the most important powers granted in this Constitution, are expressed in terms so general, in- definite and ambiguous; as to leave the rulers in the ex- ercise of them, to act too much at discretion.
2. The limits of the power of the General and State Government are not marked out with sufficient preci- sion; nor those of the former so defined as entirely to prevent a calling of jurisdiction; and there is reason to fear that the State Governments may be impaired by the General Government, and the exercise of powers grant- ed in such general words and by application only, — especially,
3d. Because the Constitution gives to the Congress an indefinite and unlimited power over all the sources of revenue in the United States; by which means they may fear that the United States will be left without ad- equate means of discharging debt or maintaining their civil establishments.
4th. Because the number of Representatives are not sufficiently numerous, authorized to possess a competent knowledge, and to exercise the trust of the Constituents, or to afford a reasonable degree of con- sidence; and no certain ratio of increase is fixed, but left at the discretion of Congress.
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SERMON on the Combat of the Duell.

By the Rev. William Maister, a Chaplain of the Army. Preached at the Camp, at Valley Forge, Feb. 1788.

EXODUS I. *Fellow men of the Hebrews struggle together.*

THE sacred book abounds with several instances of duels. The first that we read of is that of Cain and Abel; where the elder brother sent a challenge to the younger, because his sacrifice had been more acceptable to the Lord. They met and Abel fell having received the end of a club, as it is generally supposed, somewhere above his right temple.

The second of which we read, is that of the text; where two young Hebrews had met with their seconds, to decide a small difference but what it was has perplexed all commentators. Mules like a young man as he was, endeavoured to quiet their resentment to each other or to overcome it, by putting them in mind that they were brethren. The conduct of the young man was indifereat, and he received a proper check by the rebuke of the two bracklayers.

The next instance that we read of, is, that when a young officer of a bear sent a challenge to young David who reported that he was fond of eating sheep; which calumny, true or false, it behoved him, as a bear of honour, to resent. David met him and having discharged their pistols they took to the points, and in the scuffle, while the bear had thrown himself too far forward, in attempting a lunge, David caught him by the beard, and smote him through the body.

Having given these few instances from scripture, I shall go on to shew the necessity of the duel, and then to press it a little on my audience.

'Tis necessary: For it is not every man that hath the command of his passions, and these unless they are suffered to evaporate in some manner, will burst out into roberies, and burglaries, and do damage to society. The passion of pride is one of the most troublesome amongst men, and to this there is nothing so powerful an antidote as fear which never fails to be excited when the challenge comes to hand. The duel is like an electrical conductor to all evil passions. The man who this moment was boiling hot with pride and every haughty passion, is now calm and moderate, for somebody has lent him a challenge. It is the only misfortune that this very principle of fear prevents the certainty of the execution; for by giving a trembling to the hand, it comes upon that very few are wounded, and still fewer fall in the combat. To remedy this I would propose, that the duellists should stand nearer, and put their noses into each others barrels, while the pistols are discharged. Swift says, "He would be sorry to see the legislators make any more laws against duelling, for if villains and rascals will dispute one another, it is for the good of the community." But the misfortune is, they will not dispute one another, but this principle of fear, and the distance at which they stand, prevents a shot being effectual.

The philosophers of the former times, and the ecclesiastics of the present, are against duelling; forsooth, because by study and thinking their warm passions are rendered tame, and they have no need of blood-letting; but they do not consider, that there are many others, who if they were not suffered to give themselves vent this way would rage and roar like mad bears, and for the world on fire.

Having now seen the necessity of this exercise, it remains that I press it a little on my audience. Who is there amongst you that did not praise the corporal the other day, who having observed something like a smile on the countenance of his neighbour, and not being able to assign the cause of silent him a challenge. The corporal, it is true, received a ball through the rim of his belly, and was buried that evening; but it is his consolation that he is now, with the angel Michael in Abraham's bosom.

When I mention the angel Michael it brings to my mind the circumstance of the devil sending him a challenge. But according to the apostle Jude, he (that is Michael) durst not accept of it, or, as it is in the translation, "bring a railing accusation, but said the Lord rebuke thee." I do not know what to say for Michael, for certainly it must be granted that, in this instance, he acted not like an angel of honour.

The only objection that I know of against the practice of the duel, and with an answer to which I shall conclude is, that in the new testament it is considerably discouraged by the spirit of forbearance, inculcated in these words, "if any man smiteth thee on the right cheek, turn to him the other also." But to this it is to be said, that "the pilot of the Galilean lake," as Milton calls him (for I know my business better than to speak plainly out and to say Christ in an army) the pilot of the Galilean lake I say, and his apollies, among whose discourses and writings, sentiments like these are found, were not what we call men of honour. Bred up about the sea of Tiberias, they had not the best opportunity, by travelling to become acquainted with the world. Nay our Saviour himself plainly tells you so, "Verily I say unto you, my kingdom is not of this world." Now, as men of honour never propose to go into his kingdom, why shall they frame themselves agreeable to its customs? It is absurd; and while they live in this world, let them live as becomes men that know the world; and when they go to the devil, let them fend challenges as he has done, and fight duels according to his dictates.

The Hon. Judges' process for the debt of Lebanon, has allowed ten months from the date hereof to the creditors of the estate of Jonathan King, late of County, deceased, to bring in their claims; as a part of said estate, property assessed, after which time they will be legally debarr'd. Notice is hereby given, that I will attend on said business for the last time on Monday, August, September and October next, at the house of said deceased, from two o'clock in the afternoon until six at each of said days.

STEPHEN KING, Administrator.

Boston, July 15, 1777.

W. R. Those indebted are desired to make payments.

THE Co partnership of JOHN CALDWELL & Co. being dissolved, all persons having open accounts with said Company, are requested to call and settle the same. Those persons who are indebted either by Book or Note are informed, that unless they immediately discharge their respective balances, that their Accounts and Obligations will be placed in an Attorney's hands to settle, and that they will be called on without exception.

Hartford, July 21, 1788.

JOHN CALDWELL,

Hith to dispose of cheap for Cash,
SURIN M Spirit per hoghead or barrel—old and excellent.
 St. Croix
 Demarara } Rum—genuine.
 Barbados }
 Belt brown Sugars per hoghead or barrel.
 Bohea Tea by chest or 100 wt.—cheap.
 Madeira Wine, per pipe.
 Cotton by 50 or 100 lb.

Price Six Pence.

Just Printed by NATHANIEL PATTEN,
A SERMON delivered in Bark-

hemstead, on Christmas-Day last, before the Episcopal Society and others convened on that solemn occasion. By JONATHAN MARSH, A. M. Pastor of the Church of Christ in New-Hartford.

"For unto us a Child is born, unto us a Son is given, and the government shall be upon his shoulders, and his name shall be called Wonderful, Counsellor, the mighty God, the everlasting Father, the Prince of Peace." Prophet Isaiah.

"She shall bring forth a son, and thou shalt call his name Jesus, for he shall save his people from their sins." St. Matt.

Published at the request of the hearers.
 The proposals for Otterwald's Christian Theology may be returned to Nathaniel Patten by the first week in August next, as there are already double the number subscribed for that was expected.

N. B. The author of the Christian Theology is author of the Lectures on the exercise of the Sacred Ministry, and the Arguments of the Books and Chapters of the Old and New Testaments, with practical Observations.

Wanted One Thousand Sheep and Lamb Skins Tann'd with white oak bark, whole grain'd, unoil'd, and the thinner the better, for which good pay will be made by

NATHANIEL PATTEN.

Hartford, July 14, 1788.

THE subscriber, who has obtained subscribers for 100000 acres of land in the County of Lancaster, (which was purchased of the native and Commonwealth of Massachusetts, by Messrs Phelps and Gorham) hereby notifies said subscribers that their meeting which was proposed to be holden at Mr. Butler's tavern, in Hartford, on the 25th day of August next, will be deferred till the 10th day of September next, to be holden at the same place at 2 o'clock P. M. If Mr. Phelps should not return from the Jamaica country seasonably to meet them, and a further advertisement should be necessary, the aforesaid subscribers will be advertised of the same in this paper.

ELIZER BURNHAM.

Hartford, July 22, 1787.

FREDERICK BULL,

Wants to purchase a number of likely Horses for shipping.

WANTED at the Woolen

Manufacture several sprightly, active Lads, (as Apprentices) from 14 to 16 years old—of good characters and abilities—care will be taken to instruct them in such branches of the business, as shall be most agreeable to them.—A good narrow or Broad-Cloth Weaver, and one or two good Scriblers, would find constant employment, and good wages—by applying to

DANIEL HINSDALE.

CASH paid for WOOL.

Hartford, July, 1788.

T O B E L E T,

A Convenient S H O P, lately occupied by Mr. James Jepson, a few rods North of the Court-House, on the Main Street. For terms apply to

CAPEN BULL, jun.

Hartford, July 13, 1788.

T O B E L E T, (and possession given immediately.)



THE Houfe and Store, the property of the heirs of the late Benjamin Payne, Esq.—The accommodations are equal to any in this City on lease, having a Barn, Woodhouse and back Store, Well, Cistern &c.—Together with a large and excellent Garden—lately occupied by Mr. Solomon Meers.—For terms apply to

C. GOODRICH, A. GOODRICH'S.

Hartford, July 12, 1788.

Cash given for Bees-Wax,

By HUDSON and GOODWIN.

Wanted by the Printers hereof, A number of tanned Sheep-Skins.

For which good pay will be made.

IMPORTATION.

THE subscriber has removed his store of Glass and other Goods, to the first red Store North of Hudson and Goodwin's Printing-Office, where he has now open a quantity of Double Flint and Pale Glass Goods, equal in quality and lowness of price to any ever imported into this State, among which are, Quart Decanters, with stopps, ditto with ditto cut and groundin, ditto with ditto and cut necks fingered at bottom, and an Adelpia border round the middle; pint Decanters and Oil and Vinegar Cruets cut to match the quarts; Pear bowl Wine Glasses with fluted stems and bowls round; Pear bowl Goblets with fancy borders; half pint Tumblers fingered at bottom and bordered; Balloon Mustards cut and ground in; rib'd Salts; the Dutchesse of Rutland's fancy Oval Sals, which for elegance of shape and cutting, are not exceeded; fashionable Bosom Fountains for Lady's to carry flowers in, and peculiarly adapted for the purpose; Smelling Bottles of various shapes, so absolutely necessary for little Misses the approaching hot season and at the small price of 8d. each; Balloon half pint Tumblers; common shape ditto; plain Pint Tumblers; pint Tumblers and covers cut finger'd at bottom with a border; round bowl and bell bowl Wine Glasses at 3s. 6d. a dozen; Jelly Glasses rib'd; plain and moulded Vinegars, Salts, Mustards, Jill and half jill Tumblers, blue Cream Jugs, white ditto, round and square common Urks, blue Butter Coolers, white ditto, which if once experienced in hot weather every family would use that is able to buy a pound of butter in a week; heavy Mason Glasses, Tale Mafons, &c. Also, a small assortment of Crockery, and of such articles as are constantly in use. 4-4 and 7-8 Irish Liren by the piece, printed Linens by ditto, 9-8 Sheetings by do. Cotton Wool, black Lastings twilled, black Durant, Fullians, spotted Janes, fashionable waistcoat Patterns, striped and plain 6-4 Mustins, Romal, and Bandana Handkerchiefs, corron co linen do. fashionable Shawls of various figures, lawn Handkerchiefs, Chintzes and Calicoes of much approved figures, Ribbons of various colors and widths 4/4 Pins, Irish 7-8 Dowlasses of high bleach, it being the most durable linen manufacture that Ireland produces, Lady's and Gentlemens dressing combs, &c. &c. All of which articles, the public may rest well satisfied, shall be afforded at an exceeding low rate, altho' their humble servant has not the article of Bohea Tea to use as a bait, at the well known and low price of 2s 5d. a lb.

THOMAS TISDALE.

N. B. The drooping in spirit are informed, that he keeps excellent Tenevise Wine, Surinam Cordial, and the essence of St. Croix Rum, for sale. Part don me when I say so TRUST, as the smallness of my profits in the retailing line will not allow of it.

Hartford, June 30, 1788.

F R E S H !

F R E S H !

F R E S H !

THE subscriber has just received a fresh supply of almost every kind of English and India GOODS, suitable for the present season, amongst which are a fine assortment of Chintzes, Calicoes, Gauzes and Gausee Ribbons, and a large assortment of Books and Stationery. Among the assortment are ONE HUNDRED articles CHEAPER than ever they were sold before, by NATHANIEL PATTEN, at his Store ten rods North of the Court House, and directly opposite the North Meeting-House, Hartford.

N. B. Hard Ware, Groceries, Room Paper, Writing Paper, Blank Write, Deeds, &c. &c. &c. &c.

The highest Price in CASH given for Loan-Office Certificates, Final Settlement Notes, Judets for Interest and Soldiers Notes.

By NORMAN BUTLER, WHO HAS FOR SALE,

Civil List Orders.

Excellent BOHEA TEA at 2s. 5d. per single pound.

HUDSON and GOODWIN, Have for Sale near the Bridge, HARTFORD,

CLOTHIER'S Press-Papers, of the best kind, by the Grofs or Dozen.

Bonnet Papers, by the Grofs, Dozen or single. Writing Paper, by the Ream or Quire.

Common and small Wrapping Paper. Ink-Powder, Holland Quills, Sealing-Wax. Excellent Sheathing Paper.

Law's Collection of Music, by the dozen or single. Webster's Institutes, all parts, by the thousand, groce, dozen or single.

Dillworth's Spelling Books, by the dozen or single. Watts's Psalms, by the Grofs, Dozen or single. Account Books of various sizes—Record Books, Blanks of all kinds used in this State.

A few Books on Divinity, History, Physic, &c.

Grain of any kind, Rags, Tann'd Sheep Skins, Bees-Wax, or Public Securities, will be received in payment.